2 is unsupported,t say the least . Spatial separation is clearly relational.. and clrarly physical, in that it objectively mrasureablr and quantifiable. The only objection would be the folk-physics objection that the physical is *stuff*.
>No matter how you conceive of the atoms—as probability clouds, states of space, fields—the question arises: why don’t the atoms simply “pass through” each other
If you conceive of it in terms of quantum mechanics, the answer is obvious: the pauli exclusion principle means that the electrons...which define the "size" of the atom, since the nucleus is tiny...cannot occupy the same state.. the electron orbitals either have to bounce off each other, or both atoms fuse into a new mutual state, a H2 molecule. No casual "passing through" is allowed.
"Physical interaction always ends up appealing to laws, rules, or principles—inherently abstract things that specify what happens when A relates to B in a particular way."
You are pointing out that the Pauli Exclusion Principle is, in fact, *not* a principle, *nor* does it specify how two particles interact when relating to each other a particular way.
Thank you for the very intelligent and thought-through response.
A quick note on the use of "reductive" in this substack before continuing. Whether if physicalism ends up being reductive, anti-inflationary, or fundamentally backwards depends on the default position one approaches physicalism from. If they are dualist then they'd give the reductive adjective. If they are already physicalist then they *might* give the anti-inflationary adjective to physicalism. If they are an idealist then they'd say physicalism is fundamentally backwards. If you haven't established what the correct default position is then it isn't necessarily the case that physicalism is reductive.
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Your "Atoms 'Bumping Into Each Other'" example for the regress problem presupposes a relata primitive ontology. That is, there are primitive stand alone substances titled atoms where relational interactions are derivative and between those atoms. What about a physicalism like Ontic Structural Realism though? An OSR like James Ladyman or Don Ross would argue relations are primitive and relata are emergent derivatives. This ontology for physicalism claims that reality fundamentally is an ontological co-determining web of relations where there are relational nodes. These relational nodes are more stable configurations of structural relations. Asymmetries in the stabilities of the co-determining relations web of reality are the objects interacting with each other with causality, space, and time. Objects, space, time, and causality would all be relational nodes in this ontology. This physicalist metaphysics better conforms to experimental outcomes found in quantum mechanics and general relativity.
A potential objection you might have is that a universal web of co-determining relations sounds circular. This is a category mistake. Circular reasoning is an epistemic concept which is dependent on a mind trying to justify beliefs. The universal web of co-determining relations is ontological and mind-independent.
If OSR is correct then every *thing* must go when dealing with ontological fundamentality. If interested in more details, I'd read "Every Thing Must Go" by James Ladyman and Don Ross. If you despise it then I'd love to read your attacks on it on substack!
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Scientific laws are descriptive and mathematically expressed. They are captured through the use of the scientific method on empirically observed regularities. Scientific theories are explanatory frameworks. The success of these theories in prediction and unification indicates that their mathematical structure mirrors the structure of reality itself. Scientific theories being explanatory within science means there is no risk of throwing away explanation and rationality by keeping scientific laws descriptive.
What would this mean? How could physical objects be part of a physical universe but their interactions are not part of the physical universe?
My world is full of physical things interacting. If the syllogism is sound, this is an illusion. Either there are physical objects that do not interact physically, or there are not even any physical objects and everything is an illusion.
I can't quite wrap my head around this. It seems less absurd to say that i perceive the appearance of phsyical objects interacting physically, but i do not have a full explanation of how this works.
> So at some point, physical interaction always ends up appealing to laws, rules, or principles ...
What if that's not quite true? What if physical interactions *don't* appeal to laws, rules, or principles ... but *humans* trying to explain them *do* appeal to those things.
Why do physical objects have to appeal to anything as an explanation? Explanations are a property of consciousness, no? Does physical matter *require* consciousness in order to do whatever it is that physical matter does?
Humans require consciousness for our abstractions, but does this human need necessarily constrict the physical matter that is observed?
>But are the premises true?
2 is unsupported,t say the least . Spatial separation is clearly relational.. and clrarly physical, in that it objectively mrasureablr and quantifiable. The only objection would be the folk-physics objection that the physical is *stuff*.
>No matter how you conceive of the atoms—as probability clouds, states of space, fields—the question arises: why don’t the atoms simply “pass through” each other
If you conceive of it in terms of quantum mechanics, the answer is obvious: the pauli exclusion principle means that the electrons...which define the "size" of the atom, since the nucleus is tiny...cannot occupy the same state.. the electron orbitals either have to bounce off each other, or both atoms fuse into a new mutual state, a H2 molecule. No casual "passing through" is allowed.
Consider learning physics.
Ah, now I understand. So when I said:
"Physical interaction always ends up appealing to laws, rules, or principles—inherently abstract things that specify what happens when A relates to B in a particular way."
You are pointing out that the Pauli Exclusion Principle is, in fact, *not* a principle, *nor* does it specify how two particles interact when relating to each other a particular way.
Thank you for the very intelligent and thought-through response.
Sarcasm not helpful.
A quick note on the use of "reductive" in this substack before continuing. Whether if physicalism ends up being reductive, anti-inflationary, or fundamentally backwards depends on the default position one approaches physicalism from. If they are dualist then they'd give the reductive adjective. If they are already physicalist then they *might* give the anti-inflationary adjective to physicalism. If they are an idealist then they'd say physicalism is fundamentally backwards. If you haven't established what the correct default position is then it isn't necessarily the case that physicalism is reductive.
-----------------------------------
Your "Atoms 'Bumping Into Each Other'" example for the regress problem presupposes a relata primitive ontology. That is, there are primitive stand alone substances titled atoms where relational interactions are derivative and between those atoms. What about a physicalism like Ontic Structural Realism though? An OSR like James Ladyman or Don Ross would argue relations are primitive and relata are emergent derivatives. This ontology for physicalism claims that reality fundamentally is an ontological co-determining web of relations where there are relational nodes. These relational nodes are more stable configurations of structural relations. Asymmetries in the stabilities of the co-determining relations web of reality are the objects interacting with each other with causality, space, and time. Objects, space, time, and causality would all be relational nodes in this ontology. This physicalist metaphysics better conforms to experimental outcomes found in quantum mechanics and general relativity.
A potential objection you might have is that a universal web of co-determining relations sounds circular. This is a category mistake. Circular reasoning is an epistemic concept which is dependent on a mind trying to justify beliefs. The universal web of co-determining relations is ontological and mind-independent.
If OSR is correct then every *thing* must go when dealing with ontological fundamentality. If interested in more details, I'd read "Every Thing Must Go" by James Ladyman and Don Ross. If you despise it then I'd love to read your attacks on it on substack!
-----------------------------------
Scientific laws are descriptive and mathematically expressed. They are captured through the use of the scientific method on empirically observed regularities. Scientific theories are explanatory frameworks. The success of these theories in prediction and unification indicates that their mathematical structure mirrors the structure of reality itself. Scientific theories being explanatory within science means there is no risk of throwing away explanation and rationality by keeping scientific laws descriptive.
“all interaction is non-physical”
What would this mean? How could physical objects be part of a physical universe but their interactions are not part of the physical universe?
My world is full of physical things interacting. If the syllogism is sound, this is an illusion. Either there are physical objects that do not interact physically, or there are not even any physical objects and everything is an illusion.
I can't quite wrap my head around this. It seems less absurd to say that i perceive the appearance of phsyical objects interacting physically, but i do not have a full explanation of how this works.
> So at some point, physical interaction always ends up appealing to laws, rules, or principles ...
What if that's not quite true? What if physical interactions *don't* appeal to laws, rules, or principles ... but *humans* trying to explain them *do* appeal to those things.
Why do physical objects have to appeal to anything as an explanation? Explanations are a property of consciousness, no? Does physical matter *require* consciousness in order to do whatever it is that physical matter does?
Humans require consciousness for our abstractions, but does this human need necessarily constrict the physical matter that is observed?
Spitballin' ...